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Measures Necessary to Ensure: The ICJ’s




This article analyzes the provisional measures order of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the first provisional measures order issued by the ICJ
after its decision in LaGrand holding that such orders have binding effect. After reviewing the
background to Mexico’s action, the article focuses on Avena’s place in the Court’s provisional
measures jurisprudence, its international legal significance, its potential effects, if any, on the
ICJ’s perceived institutional legitimacy and authority, and its legal and political consequences
for the United States. In particular, the article examines the domestic legal implications of
the Court’s order for the United States in the context of developing international norms on
capital punishment and the due process standards governing its implementation in states that
continue to practise it.
Keywords
death penalty; International Court of Justice; provisional measures; relationship between
international andmunicipal law; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
On 5 February 2003 the International Court of Justice (ICJ, or the Court) ordered the
United States to take ‘allmeasures necessary to ensure’ that threeMexicannationals
incarcerated under sentences of death in the United States not be executed pending
the Court’s final judgement inAvena and Other Mexican Nationals.1 This provisional
measures orderwas the culminationof a trilogy rendered by the ICJ in cases brought
against the United States for violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
ConsularRelations.2 Ineach, states alleged thatauthoritiesof theUnitedStates failed
timely to advise their nationals – inmates convicted of capital crimes and sentenced
to death bymunicipal courts – of their right to consular notification and assistance
* Schell Fellow,Yale LawSchool. FromOctober 2002 toMay2003 the authorworked forDebevoise&Plimpton,
counsel toMexico inAvena. The views expressed are solely those of the author and should not be attributed
toMexico or Debevoise & Plimpton.
1. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), [2003] ICJ Rep. (5 Feb.) (hereafterAvenaOrder).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261 (hereafter Vienna
Convention); see LaGrand (Germany v. United States), [1999] ICJ Rep. 9 (3 Mar.) (hereafter LaGrand Order);
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States), [1998] ICJ Rep. 248 (9 April).
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under Article 36(1)(b) of the Convention.3 In each, those states invoked the Court’s
contentious jurisdictionunder theConvention’sOptional Protocol and sought stays
of the executions pending the Court’s final judgement.4 And in each of the prior
cases, the ICJ directed theUnited States to take ‘allmeasures at its disposal to ensure’
that the state’s nationals not be executed before its decision.5
InAvena, however, the Court replaced the qualifier ‘at its disposal’ with theman-
datory ‘necessary’.6 This deceptively trivial changenot only represented avictory for
Mexico, it also established a unique and vital international precedent. By omitting
the qualifier attached to its two prior provisional measures orders, the Court made
unambiguous, as Mexico had asked it to, both the ‘obligation to be imposed’ and
the ‘required result’ of its order.7 At one level, then, Avena simply reaffirmed an
axiomatic principle of international law: a state may not invoke its municipal law
or internal legal structure to excuse or justify violations of international law.8 But
for a number of reasons – concerns about its institutional legitimacy, uncertainty
about the scope and extent of its provisional measures authority, and deference to
sovereignty in a matter as quintessentially within a state’s municipal jurisdiction
as criminal law enforcement – the ICJ had been curiously reluctant to affirm that
principle in its earlier orders.9 Avena is also the first provisional measures order
issued by the ICJ after its historic decision in LaGrand holding that such orders
create binding legal obligations.10 Its import as an international precedent, finally, is
matchedby its significance forandpotential effects, legal andpolitical, on theUnited
States.
This article explores the substance and ramifications of the Avena provisional
measures order. Section 1 explains the background to the case initiated by Mexico
on 9 January 2003, the relief sought on the merits, and the parties’ submissions on
the request for provisional measures. Section 2 briefly reviews the Court’s resolu-
tion of Mexico’s request by its Order of 5 February 2003. Sections 3 and 4 appraise
3. Art. 36(1)(b) provides in pertinent part that ‘if [a foreign national of a state party] so requests, the competent
authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within
its consular district is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner . . .The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
sub-paragraph’.
4. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention onConsular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, 24 April 1963, Art. I, 21 UST 325, 326, 596 UNTS 487, 488.
5. LaGrandOrder, supra note 2, para. 29(I)(a); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2, at 258, para.
41(I).
6. AvenaOrder, supra note 1, para. 59(I)(a).
7. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of the United Mexican States, para. 19, in Avena, supra
note 1, (filed 9 Jan. 2003) (on file with author) (hereafter Request).
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Art. 27, 1155 UNTS 3331; Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Arts. 3–4, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc.
A/56/10 (2001), annexed to GA Res. 56/83 (12 Dec. 2001); see, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service
of the United Nations, [1949] ICJ Rep. 174, 180 (11 April); Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish
Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 44 (1932), at 4; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the
District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), PCIJ (ser. A) No. 24 (1930), at 12.
9. In LaGrand, the Court emphasized that its order had not ‘required the United States to exercise powers that
it did not have’, implying that the legal powers ‘at [the] disposal’ of the US federal governmentwere relevant
to its international responsibility to ensure respect for the Court’s order. LaGrand (Germany v. United States),
[2001] ICJ Rep. (27 June), para. 115 (hereafter LaGrand Judgement).
10. LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 110.
THE ICJ ’S PROVISIONAL MEASURES ORDER IN AVENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS 675
respectively the international and domestic dimensions ofAvena. I focus onAvena’s
place in the Court’s provisional measures jurisprudence, its potential effects, if
any, on the ICJ’s perceived institutional legitimacy, and its legal and political con-
sequences for theUnited States. I conclude by asking the extent towhichAvena, like
Paraguay’s and Germany’s actions before it, can or should in fact be understood, as
Judge Oda has asserted, as a manifestation of ‘abhorrence – by Mexico and others –
of capital punishment’.11
Subsequent to the preparation of this article, the ICJ rendered its decision on the
merits inAvena.12 TheCourt held that theUnited States hadbreached its obligations
under the Vienna Convention and, reiterating its formulation in LaGrand, ordered
that the United States provide ‘by means of its own choosing, review and recon-
sideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals’.13 In Avena,
however, the Court went further. It made it clear that the executive clemency hear-
ings by which the United States had claimed to comply with LaGrand ’s directive
were insufficient.14 Review and reconsideration, the Court held, must take place by
means of ‘a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of
the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome
of such reviewand reconsideration’, and ‘it is the judicial process that is suited to this
task’.15 Courts must therefore reconsider the conviction and sentence in each case
inwhich competent authorities violated the Convention and ascertainwhether the
violations ‘caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration
of criminal justice’.16 While many aspects of the ICJ’s final judgement in Avena
invite scholarly consideration, this article limits itself to analysis of the provisional
measures order, whichmerits review in its own right.
1. THE BACKGROUND TO MEXICO’S ACTION AND
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
1.1. The background toMexico’s action
Mexico brought suit against theUnited States on 9 January 2003 byfiling an applica-
tion and request for the indication of provisionalmeasures.17 It invoked the Court’s
jurisdiction under Article I of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.18 To an ex-
tent, Mexico’s application naturally followed the model established by the actions
of Paraguay and Germany. But for two principal reasons it did not simply mimic
them.
11. AvenaOrder, supra note 1 (Declaration of Judge Oda).
12. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, [2004] ICJ Rep. (31March).
13. Ibid., para. 153(9)
14. Ibid., para. 143.
15. Ibid., paras. 139, 140.
16. Ibid., para. 121; see also ibid., para. 122.
17. Application andRequest for the Indication of ProvisionalMeasures of theUnitedMexican States, 9 Jan. 2003,
inAvena and Other Mexican Nationals (on file with author) (hereafter Application).
18. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention onConsular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, supra note 4.
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First,Mexico’s geopolitical relationship to theUnitedStatesmadeboth thenature
and gravity of its suit qualitatively distinct. Neither Germany nor Paraguay share
a border with the United States. The number of Mexican nationals in the United
States dwarfs the number of German or Paraguayan nationals. Mexico’s northern
border with the United States spans 1,989 miles, adjoining California, NewMexico,
Arizona, and Texas.19 Millions of Mexicans live in the United States, temporarily or
permanently, with or without legal immigrant status.20 Mexico emphasized in its
application that ‘because of their geographic proximity and the frequent interstate
travel of their respective citizens’, the United States and Mexico had concluded a
bilateral consular convention twenty years before the Vienna Convention’s adop-
tion.21 And since then it ‘established forty-five Mexican consulates throughout the
United States, primarily in areaswith substantialMexican populations’.22 Germany
and Paraguay, by comparison, each maintain nine consulates (and one embassy) in
the United States.
Second, in part because of these geopolitical factors and in part because of the
precedents established by LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the
formandsubstanceofMexico’sargumentsdepartedsignificantlyfromtheParaguay–
Germanymodel. Mexico’s application, for example, reviewed in detail the activities
and obligations of Mexican consular officers in the United States, focusing on their
historic role in protecting Mexican nationals in conflict with the law.23 Mexico
further explained that its municipal law requires consuls to protect the rights of
Mexican nationals,24 including by providing advice, securing interpreters and com-
petent local counsel, locating evidence, communicating with family members and
witnesses, and attending legal proceedings – functions that, Mexico asserted, ‘liter-
allycanmakethedifferencebetweenlifeanddeathforMexicannationalsprosecuted
for capital crimes’.25 Finally, Mexico’s application detailed Mexico’s prior efforts to
obtain relief for its nationals convicted of capital offences after proceedings that
failed to respect Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. These included actions in US
courts, federal and state, and diplomatic overtures to the federal and state govern-
ments of the United States. Mexico explained, however, the municipal law barriers
to relief under US law and the persistent failure of its diplomacy to secure anything
more than pro forma apologies issued after the executions of its nationals had been
carried out.26
19. Migration Policy Institute, United States–Canada–Mexico Fact Sheet on Trade, Migration, and Border Cross-
ings, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/us mex can facts.htm (last visited 21March 2003).
20. UnitedStatesCensusBureau,TheHispanic Population of theUnited States (March2001) (reporting thatMexican-
Americans comprise 66.1 per cent of the 32.8million Latinos residing in theUnited States as ofMarch 2000).
21. Application, supra note 17, para. 20; see Bilateral Consular Convention of 1943, US–Mexico, 57 Stat. 800, TS
985.
22. Application, supra note 17, para. 21.
23. Ibid., paras. 22–26.
24. Mexicothereforeappears toadopt themandatoryviewofconsular functions,wherebyconsulsdonotexercise
discretion about whether to assist their nationals, but must provide them with assistance and protection if
requested. See L. T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice (1991), 124–9.
25. Application, supra note 17, para. 23.
26. Ibid., paras. 29–66; see, e.g., United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding Mexico’s
action seeking relief for violations of the Vienna Convention barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution), cert. denied, 523 US 725 (1998); Consulate General of Mexico v. Phillips, 17 F. Supp.
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When Mexico filed suit on 9 January 2003, it therefore did not represent an
isolated foreign-policy decision. Nor did Mexico simply chance to be the next state
after Germany and Paraguay to find one of its nationals facing capital punishment
afteraconviction inUnitedStatescourts followingproceedings that failed tocomply
with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.Mexico’s suit rather represented the next
step in, and perhaps the culmination of, its ongoing efforts to secure the consular
rights of its nationals in the United States – a process that continues at the domestic
legal and international political levels.
1.2. The application instituting proceedings
Mexico’s application and request for provisional measures reflected these facts.
Paraguay’s and Germany’s applications totalled less than ten pages each and con-
tained few legal citations. Mexico’s application ran to more than 70 pages and
contained scores of citations, resembling a hybrid complaint and memorandum of
law. Paraguay’s and Germany’s applications concerned individual cases. Their re-
quests for the indication of provisional measures sought the stay of one execution.
Mexico’s application averred a pattern and practice of systematic violations of the
Vienna Convention. Its request sought the stay of the executions of 54 Mexican na-
tionals presently incarcerated under a sentence of death following municipal legal
proceedings in which competent authorities of the United States allegedly failed to
respect Article 36.27
On the merits, Mexico, like Paraguay and Germany before it, requested restitu-
tio in integrum, ‘reestablish[ment] of the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if [the violations] had not been committed’,28 which, Mexico claimed,
required the United States to ‘reestablish the situation that existed before the deten-
tion of, proceedings against, and convictions and sentences of, Mexico’s nationals
in violation of the United States[’] international legal obligations’.29 And, again like
Paraguay and Germany, Mexico requested a guarantee of non-repetition.30 But un-
like the former applications, Mexico requested two additional remedies: the former
based onArticle 36(2) of the Convention,31 the latter, broadly speaking, on LaGrand.
2d 1318 (SDFla. 1998) (disclaiming jurisdiction over suit byMexico’s consul to vindicateViennaConvention
rights because of the Eleventh Amendment and the federal abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 US
37 (1971)).
27. On 11 January 2003, shortly after Mexico filed its application, Illinois’s governor commuted the sentence of
all convicts on death row in that state, three of whom had been included in Mexico’s application. See Eric
Slater, ‘Illinois Governor Commutes All Death Row Cases’, Los Angeles Times, 12 Jan. 2003, at A1. In view of
this development, Mexico informed the court that its request for provisional measures no longer applied
to these three nationals, although its application for relief on the merits with respect to their convictions
and sentences remained. It also noted that Governor Ryan had referred expressly to the concerns about the
Vienna Convention violations communicated to him by President Vicente Fox of Mexico and observed that
‘If we do not uphold international lawhere, we cannot expect our citizens to be protected outside theUnited
States.’ Letter from Santiago Oñate, Agent of the United Mexican States, to Philippe Couvreur, Registrar of
the International Court of Justice (20 Jan. 2003) (on file with author).
28. Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17 (1928), at 47 (13 Sept.).
29. Application, supra note 17, para. 281.
30. Ibid.
31. Art. 36(2) provides that Art. 36(1) rights shall be exercised ‘in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulationsmust enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended’.
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First, Mexico asked the Court to order the United States to ‘take the steps necessary
and sufficient to ensure that its municipal law enable[s] full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights afforded by article 36 are intended’.32 Second, Mexico
asked that the United States be required ‘to establish a meaningful remedy at law’
for violations of Article 36.33
1.3. The request for the indication of provisionalmeasures
Mexico’s provisional measures request likewise resembled those of Paraguay and
Germany,but, again,alsodiffered inseveralcrucial respects.Foremost, afterLaGrand,
Mexicocouldanddidemphasize theundoubtednatureof the ICJ’s provisionalmeas-
ures authority: that ‘Orders of provisional measures pursuant to article 41 establish
bindingobligations.’34 After theorders issuedinresponsetoParaguayandGermany’s
requests, Mexico also could and did seek support in those precedents, arguing that
they ‘unequivocally support Mexico’s right to provisional measures here’.35
Becauseof theUnitedStates’ responses to the ICJ’spriororders,36 however,Mexico
took the unusual step of elaborating at the pleading stage a paramount principle
of international law: that neither a state’s internal structure nor its municipal laws
may excuse or justify failures to complywith international legal obligations. Hence
Mexico emphasized that ‘both the United States and its political subdivisions have
an obligation to abide by the international legal obligations of the United States’,
and therefore that ‘whileMexico recognizes that the Courtmaywish to leave to the
United States the choice ofmeans,Mexico respectfully requests that the Court leave
no doubt as to the required result’.37
Finally, Mexico took the even more unusual step of digressing into a state’s
municipal law in an effort to establish that, in any event, the United States clearly
doeshaveamplemeansat itsdisposal toenforce theCourt’s order.38 Citing theUnited
States Constitution, federal cases, and academic commentary, Mexico reviewed in
some detail the variety of measures available to the United States to ensure that
its constituent states obey the Court’s order39 – despite what US authorities had
32. Application, supra note 17, para. 281.
33. Ibid. (emphasis added).
34. Request, supra note 7, para. 8 (citing LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 109).
35. Ibid., para. 14.
36. In both Paraguay’s and Germany’s cases, US state authorities of, respectively, Virginia and Arizona executed
the foreign nationals notwithstanding the ICJ’s provisional measures orders. In neither case did the federal
government take all the measures ‘at its disposal’ to prevent those executions, and, in Paraguay’s case, one
branch of the federal government submitted a brief to theUS SupremeCourt contending that the ICJ’s order
did not establish binding obligations. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 51, in Breard v.
Greene, 523US 371 (1998), 1997 LEXISUS Briefs 1390, at *51 (asserting that the ICJ’s ‘order is precatory rather
thanmandatory’) . On Paraguay’s action, and the failure of the United States to comply, see generally ‘Agora:
Breard ’, (1998) 92 AJIL 666–712; see also Breard v. Greene. On Germany’s action, and the failure of the United
States to comply, see B. H. Oxman and W. J. Aceves, ‘International Decision: LaGrand (Germany v. United
States)’, (1998) 96 AJIL 210, 214–15; see also Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526US 111 (1999), 112
(declining to grant Germany’s application for leave to file an original bill of complaint to enforce the ICJ’s
order because of ‘the tardiness of the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate’).
37. Request, supra note 7, para. 4.
38. Ibid., paras. 22–29.
39. Specifically,Mexico emphasized (1) that Art. 6, Clause 2 of theUS Constitution establishes the supremacy of
federal law, including treaty law, Request, supra note 7, paras. 22–23 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 US 203
(1942), 230–1, andUnited States v. Belmont, 301US 324 (1937), 331–2); (2) that ‘Either the governor or the state
clemency board is authorized to grant stays or commute sentences in all of the states on which Mexican
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claimed in the past to be obstacles to enforcement imposed by the federal structure
andmunicipal laws of theUnited States.40 In short,Mexico sought to impress on the
Court that the qualifier ‘at its disposal’ would be doubly superfluous: first, because
of the irrelevance ofmunicipal law constraints to the international responsibility of
the United States; and second, because even a cursory review of that municipal law
belied the asserted inability of the federal government to ensure that its constituent
states comply with the ICJ’s order.41
1.4. The provisionalmeasures hearing
After the first round of oral submissions at the provisional measures hearing on 21
January 2003,42 Mexico pointed out an evident tension in theUnited States’ position
on this score: on the one hand, it agreed that its municipal law should play no role
in the Court’s decision; on the other, it explained ‘the complications of federalism
and . . . suggest[ed] that in fact those complicationswere somehowa reason to repeat
the formulation’ adopted by theCourt in LaGrand andViennaConvention onConsular
Relations.43 In this regard Mexico reminded the Court that ‘from the standpoint of
international law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely
factswhich express thewill and constitute the activity of States, in the samemanner
as do legal decisions or administrative measures’.44
The United States did not directly take issue with the legal principles set forth
by Mexico. Nor did it contest jurisdiction, perhaps recognizing that its arguments
on this issue would fare no better at the provisional measures stage than in the
nationals presently remain on death row,’ Request, supra note 7, para. 26; (3) that federal courts may enjoin
actionsby theconstituent states inviolationof federal law, including treatyobligations,Request, supranote7,
para. 27 (citing Asakura v. Seattle, 265 US 332 (1924) (enjoining enforcement of municipal ordinance in
violation of treaty with Japan)); (4) that the President may issue an executive order requiring compliance
with federal law, including international law, Request, supra note 7, para. 28 (citing Dames &Moore v. Regan,
453 US 654 (1982)); and (5) that the Attorney General of the United States may bring suit against the
constituent states to enforce treaty obligations, see Request, supra note 7, para. 29 (citing, inter alia, United
States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 928–9 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US 801 (1982)).
40. See, e.g., Memorial of the United States of America, 27 March 2000, paras. 121–127, in LaGrand (describing
constraints on the federal government’s ability to ensure compliance with the ICJ’s order allegedly imposed
by its federal constitutional structure); see also ibid., para. 118 (asserting that ‘By immediately transmitting
theOrder to theGovernor of Arizona, theUnited States placed theOrder in the hands of the one officialwho,
at that stage, might have had legal authority to stop the execution’).
41. Mexico therefore expressly asked the ICJ to impose an ‘obligation of result’ – the precise kind of order –
indeed the precise language – that the Court had disclaimed in reviewing the nature of the obligation that
its provisional measures order in LaGrand had imposed. See LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 115.
42. As an initial matter, Mexico argued that it met the requirements for provisional measures under Art. 41 of
the ICJ Statute, which authorizes the Court ‘to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisionalmeasureswhich ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party’. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, Art. 41, UN Charter (annex), 59 Stat. 1055. The ICJ’s precedents
establish that to qualify for provisionalmeasures a statemust show (1) prima facie jurisdiction, (2) an urgent
need topreserve the rights of theparties, (3) a probability of irreparable harm, and (4) that anorderwouldnot
anticipate the Court’s judgement on themerits. SeeNuclear Tests (Australia v. France), [1973] ICJ Rep. 99, 101,
para. 13 (22 June) (prima facie jurisdiction); ibid., para. 20 (ordermaynot anticipate judgement on themerits);
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v.
Serbia &Montenegro), [1993] ICJ Rep. 3, 19, para. 34 (8 April) (irreparable prejudice); Passage Through the Great
Belt (Finland v. Denmark), [1991] ICJ Rep. 12, 17, para. 23 (July 29) (urgency).
43. Transcript of Oral Argument, 21 Jan. 2003 (hereafter Hearing Transcript), rebuttal at 21, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/imus_icr2003-03_20030121.PDF.
44. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, PCIJ (ser. A) No. 7 (1926), at 19 (25May).
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cases of Paraguay andGermany.45 It instead contended that the orderMexico sought
would be an exorbitant exercise of the ICJ’s provisionalmeasures authority:Mexico
‘ask[s] this Court to intrude deeply into the entire criminal justice system of the
United States’, to ‘begin dictating the outcomes of criminal cases’.46 The United
States further argued that the order requested byMexico would be at odds with the
remedy for Article 36 violations articulated in LaGrand, ‘review and reconsidera-
tion’ of the conviction and sentence taking account of the violation.47 Provisional
measures, theUnited Statesmaintained, could not provide interim relief thatwould
exceed the maximum remedy on the merits to which a state might be entitled.48
Because, theUnitedStatesargued,LaGrandentitlesMexicannationalsonly toreview
and reconsideration,49 a stay could not be deemed a measure to preserve Mexico’s
rights or those of its nationals; for those rights, by hypothesis, do not exist.
By making this argument, however, the United States conflated two issues: the
standards for granting provisional relief under Article 41, on the one hand, and
the remedy on the merits for the violations alleged by Mexico, on the other. Cir-
cumstances may well exist in which the Court’s ability to render full relief on the
merits to one party requires that it preserve the status quo, even if that necessitates
an order that implicates legal rights that may not, strictly speaking, belong to that
party (or even exist). Mexico may not, for example, have had a right to vacatur of
the convictions and sentences of its nationals, a form of relief that the Court indeed
ultimately declined to order in its decision on the merits. But to execute Mexico’s
nationals before the Court had the opportunity to rule on the merits would plainly
have precluded the ICJ from finally awarding them any form of meaningful relief,
except, perhaps, for ex post facto compensation. Equally, it would have improperly
anticipated a judgement on the merits.50
To sustain its argument, the United States also put itself in an awkward litigation
posture. By contending that neither Mexico nor its nationals possess the rights that
Mexico sought, by its request for provisionalmeasures, topreserve, theUnited States
assumed the burden to establish, on themerits, two controversial legal propositions
at the provisional measures stage: first, that LaGrand entitles Mexican nationals
only to ‘review and reconsideration’, neither more nor less; and second, that the
executive clemency hearings by which the United States purported to implement
LaGrand constitute ‘review and reconsideration’.51 Yet those very propositions tend
to invest the Court with rather than divest it of jurisdiction and authority to order
45. Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, Argument of the United States of America, para. 2.4 (declining to address
jurisdiction but reserving the ‘right to contest the Court’s jurisdiction at the appropriate stage later in the
case’).
46. Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, para. 1.6; see also ibid., paras. 3.37–3.47.
47. Ibid., para. 3.4; see LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 125.
48. Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, paras. 3.1–3.6.
49. LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 125.
50. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), supra note 42, 103, para. 20 (22 June).
51. See Hearing Transcript, supra note 43, paras. 3.10–3.11. As Mexico noted in rebuttal, this assumes the
point in dispute, i.e., the meaning of ‘review and reconsideration’. See Hearing Transcript, supra note 43,
rebuttal at 13 (‘Mexico does not believe that the Vienna Convention affords nationals deprived of their
rights an opportunity to beg for mercy’.); ibid, rebuttal at 12 (‘Mexico is confident that under any reasonable
interpretationof thisCourt’s judgment inLaGrand, that the standardless, secretive andunreviewableprocess
that is called clemency cannot and does not satisfy this Court’s mandate in [LaGrand]’.).
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provisional measures – for both indicate clear disputes over the interpretation and
application of the Convention after LaGrand.52
2. THE COURT’S ORDER OF 5 FEBRUARY 2003
In its request, and again at oral argument, Mexico asked the Court to act ‘with the
utmost dispatch’.53 The ICJ issued its order on 5 February 2003. Early in the text, the
Court telegraphed its agreement with Mexico that a genuine dispute existed over
the interpretation of the rights set forth in Article 36. It quoted Mexico’s assertion
that ‘the rights conferred by Article 36 . . . are not rights without remedies’ and
supported that proposition by citing LaGrand.54 Conversely, the Court noted the
United States’ contrary argument about the nature of the obligations imposed by
LaGrand and its representation that it had been complying with those obligations –
review and reconsideration – by executive clemency processes.55
Havingconcluded that agenuinedispute exists, andhence that it possessedprima
facie jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol,56 the Court proceeded to analyze
whether an indication of provisional measures would unduly prejudice the United
States.TheICJreiteratedthat its ‘function . . . is toresolveinternational legaldisputes
between States, inter alia when they arise out of the interpretation or application
of international conventions, and not to act as a court of criminal appeal’, but
after the LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations orders, it responded
confidently, if simply, that it ‘may indicate provisionalmeasureswithout infringing
these principles’.57 The Court found that the three cases cited in Mexico’s request
as presenting the most imminent risks of executions satisfied the requirement of
urgency. Itheld,however, thatatthat junctureitwouldbeneedlesslysweepingtostay
the executions of all 54Mexican nationals enumerated inMexico’s application.58
In the operative paragraph of its order the Court therefore, unanimously, indic-
ated:
(a) TheUnited States of America shall take allmeasures necessary to ensure thatMr.
César Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres
Aguilera are not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings;
52. Mexico’s request therefore differed from that of Libya inQuestions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), [1992] ICJ Rep. 114
(14 April), where the Court denied Libya’s request for provisional measures on the ground that ‘whatever
the situation previous to the adoption of [SC Res. 748 (1992)], the rights claimed by Libya under the
Montreal Convention cannot now be regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provi-
sional measures’. Ibid., at 126–7, para. 43 (emphasis added). After LaGrand, the existence of the rights invoked
byMexico cannot be disputed – only their proper interpretation and application. But that, of course, supplies
with rather than divests the ICJ of jurisdiction.
53. Request, supra note 7, para. 15.
54. AvenaOrder, supranote 1, para. 3 (quotingApplication, supranote 17, para. 18, andLaGrand Judgement, supra
note 9, para. 125); see O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, ed. M. DeWolfe Howe (1963 [1881]), 169.
55. AvenaOrder, supra note 1, paras. 30, 37.
56. See ibid., paras. 38–42.
57. Ibid., para. 48 (citing LaGrandOrder, supra note 2, at 15, para. 25 (3 March)).
58. Ibid., para. 56 (observing that ‘the other individuals listed in Mexico’s Application, although currently on
death row, are not in the same position as the three persons identified in the preceding paragraph of this
Order’).
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(b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the Court of all
measures taken in implementation of this Order.59
3. INTERNATIONAL APPRAISAL
3.1. Jurisdiction
Judge Oda joined the Avena provisional measures order, but issued a declaration to
reiterate ‘doubts concerning the Court’s definition of “disputes arising out of the
interpretation and application” of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’.60
In his view Mexico and the United States did not dispute the interpretation and
application of the Vienna Convention; rather, ‘While theremay be a question of the
appropriate remedy for the violation, that is a matter of general international law,
not of the interpretation or application of the Convention.’61
On this issue, the Court stands on solid ground. First, of course, at the provisional
measures stage, theCourtneedonlysatisfy itself that ithasprimafacie jurisdiction.62
But in any event, the suggestion that the Court lacks jurisdiction over a dispute
about the remedies for conceded violations of a treaty simply because they have
been conceded is difficult to accept, both as to the Vienna Convention specifically
and treaty disputes generally. The United States itself, as counsel for Mexico noted,
rejected this view inUnited States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.63 Disputes
abouttheremediesinternationallawprescribesforConventionviolationsconstitute
disputes about the ‘interpretation and application of the Convention’.64
In fact, few treaties specifyparticular remedies for their violation. States conclude
treaties within the context of general principles on remedies under international
law, most importantly the well-known principle of restitutio in integrum articulated
in Chorzów Factory.65 There, the Permanent Court of International Justice affirmed
that ‘reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention,
and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself ’.66 Itwouldbeodd, then,
59. Ibid., para. 59.
60. AvenaOrder, supra note 1 (Declaration of Judge Oda); cf. LaGrandOrder, supra note 2, (3March) (Declaration
of Judge Oda); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2, (9 April) (Declaration of Judge Oda).
61. Ibid. (emphasis in original). Judge Oda also appeared to agree with the United States that the Court’s order
inappropriately ‘interferes in a State’s criminal law system’, by ‘fail[ing] to respect the sovereignty of the State
and plac[ing] itself on a par with the supreme court of the State’. In view of these strongly expressed views,
why Judge Oda concurred is not entirely clear. In both LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
he said that he voted to stay the executions on humanitarian grounds notwithstanding his disagreements
with the majority, and it is reasonable to speculate that the same considerations motivated his decision to
join theAvenaOrder.
62. See, e.g.,Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), supra note 42, 101, para. 13 (June 22).
63. See Transcript of Oral Submissions (rebuttal at 5), in Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2, (9
April).
64. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention onConsular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, supra note 4.Mexico’s application in any event raises questions not only about the remedies for,
but also about the precise content and meaning of, the rights conferred by Art. 36. See Application, supra
note 17, para. 5 (asserting that ‘Mexico and the United States disagree both on the scope and the nature of
the rights conferred by article 36, including the meaning of the phrase, “without delay”’).
65. Factory at Chorzów, supra note 28; see also Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] ICJ Rep. 4,
23 (9 April).
66. Ibid. at 29 (emphasis added); cf. LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 48 (‘Where jurisdiction exists over
a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required for the Court to consider
the remedies a party has requested for the breach of the obligation’). Responding to a similar assertion by
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if the absence of an express provision on remedies divested the Court of jurisdiction
where a dispute over that dimension of the interpretation and application of a
multilateral treaty plainly exists.
3.2. Propriety of the order
Did the ICJ exceed its legitimate provisional measures authority? The Avena order
largely conforms to the precedents established by LaGrand andVienna Convention on
Consular Relations. To the extent that those cases persuade, it is difficult to argue that
Mexico’s request should have been treated differently.67 But however accurate the
ICJ’s repeated disclaimer that it will not act ‘as a court of criminal appeal’,68 to stay
criminal sentences will inevitably be perceived by some observers and commenta-
tors as an illegitimate or exorbitant exercise of the Court’s provisional measures
authority – if only because, in effect, it may seem indistinguishable from the relief
that a municipal appellate court might order. An international stay of municipal
criminalproceedings isunquestionablyanunusualexerciseofprovisionalmeasures
authority. It is therefore worth asking whether Avena, like its predecessor orders,
augurs an inappropriate level of interference by the ICJ in the sovereign affairs of
those states fromwhich its jurisdiction and authority derive.
In general, provisional measures affect matters readily understood as traditional
concerns of international law: the rights and duties of states vis-à-vis one another.
In Nuclear Tests,69 for example, the ICJ ordered France to refrain from ‘nuclear tests
causingthedepositof radio-active fall-outonAustralianterritory’. InPassageThrough
the Great Belt,70 it denied Finland’s request for an order that Denmark ‘refrain from
continuingorotherwiseproceedingwith . . . constructionworks inconnectionwith
the planned bridge project over the East Channel of the Great Belt as would impede
thepassageofships . . . toandfromFinnishportsandshipyards’. InLandandMaritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria,71 it instructed those states to take no action
prejudicial to its adjudication of their dispute over the sovereignty of the Bakassi
Peninsula. Each thus involved quintessentially inter-state issues – transboundary
environmental harms, the law of the sea, and frontier and maritime boundaries,
respectively. The acts sought to be stayed implicated the rights of states qua states.
In Avena, by contrast, as in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
the Court ordered the United States to stay acts – the imposition of criminal
the United States in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provisional measures hearing, counsel for
Paraguayobserved thatwere thecontraryargumentaccepted, ‘itwouldbenecessary to reproduce theArticles
on State Responsibility in every treaty, and surely that is not the expectation of treaty drafters. Instead, the
fundamental understanding with respect to remedies is part of a legal context in which any treaty must
operate.’
67. SeeRequest, supranote 7, paras. 15–16 (quotingLaGrandOrder, supranote 2, para. 19 (3March)). This is not to
suggest that either Paraguay or Germany deliberately failed to submit their requests ‘in good time’; it is only
to point out that Mexico sought to heed LaGrand ’s directive concerning the timely submission of requests
for the indication of provisional measures.
68. Avena Order, supra note 1, para. 48 (citing LaGrand Order, supra note 2, para. 25); see also Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, supra note 2, at 257, para. 38 (9 April).
69. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), supra note 42, 106, para. 36 (22 June).
70. Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), supra note 42, 14, para. 7 (29 July).
71. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), [1996] ICJ Rep. 13, 24,
para. 49 (15March).
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sentences – ordinarily regarded as ‘matters . . . essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of [that] state’.72 Avena does not implicate a matter on which international
lawarguablyprovides for concurrent criminal jurisdictionbymore thanone state.73
YetAvena’s alleged intrusion intomunicipal law should not be understood as a rad-
ical departure from the Court’s conventional practice. The Vienna Convention and
its subject matter (consular relations) implicate the international rights of Mexico
and theUnited States qua states. The regulation of consular relations between states
has been a vital function of international law since its modern evolution following
the Peace ofWestphalia.74 Avena therefore did nomore than preserve certain treaty
rights in connection with a traditional subject of international concern, pending
the Court’s final judgement.75 That it incidentally may have impeded the usual
progression of criminal proceedings in the United States remains, as a matter of
international law, irrelevant.76 The ICJ’s order in Avena, like those in LaGrand and
ViennaConvention onConsularRelations,maybeunusual insofar as it affects amatter –
theoperationof a state’s criminal laws–ordinarilyoutside the scopeof international
concern. That alone, however, does notmake it either unprecedented or an abuse of
the Court’s authority under its Statute.
3.3. Precedential value
Howshould theCourt’s substitution of ‘necessary’ for the qualifier ‘at its disposal’ be
understood?Mexico argued adamantly for that change, and the Court acceded to its
request. To understand why, it should first be emphasized that the Court’s decision
to insert ‘at its disposal’ in the LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
orders did not arise in a vacuum. In the latter case, Paraguay had asked the ICJ to
order ‘that theGovernment of theUnited States take themeasures necessary to ensure
thatMr. Breard not be executed pending the disposition of this case’.77 But the Court
nonetheless chose to limit its order to thosemeasures at theUnited States’ ‘disposal’.
That formulation had appeared, in substance, in prior provisional measures orders
in which a state’s ability to complymight reasonably be subject to doubt.78 Second,
the Court has historically indicated provisional measures hesitantly, emphasizing
72. UN Charter, Art. 2(7).
73. See SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 (1927) (Sept. 7); cf. Wildenhus’s Case, 120 US 1 (1887).
74. See generally Lee, supra note 24, at 3–7 (describing the origins and evolution of consular relations).
75. Provisional measures orders based on treaty obligations enjoy ample support in international precedents,
which include orders that arguably interfered far more dramatically with matters intimately related to
domestic sovereignty, for example internal revolution. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (United States v. Iran), [1979] ICJ Rep. 7, 12, para. 25 (15 Dec.) (indicating provisional measures in
connection with the Iranian hostage crisis, in part on the basis of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, notwithstanding the Court’s agreement that ‘it is no doubt true that the Islamic revolution of
Iran is a matter “essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran”’); cf. Bosnia &Herzegovina v.
Serbia & Montenegro, supra note 42, (8 April) (ordering Yugoslavia to ‘take all measures within its power to
prevent commission of the crime of genocide’ on its territory or by forces within its effective control).
76. Cf. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), Judgement of 14 February 2002, para. 78(3), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/imus_icr2003-03_20030121.pdf (ordering ‘that
the Kingdom of Belgiummust, bymeans of its own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and
so inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated’).
77. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of the Republic of Paraguay, April 3, 1998, para. 8(a)
(emphasis added), inVienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2, (9 April).
78. E.g., Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro, supra note 42, para. 52(a)(1) (8 April) (ordering Yugoslavia
to ‘take all measureswithin its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide’) (emphasis added).
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their extraordinarynature.79 Their impositionhas frequently provoked controversy
within the Court, producing numerous separate declarations and dissents.80 Much
of this hesitation, if not apprehension, about provisional measures can fairly be
ascribed to the Court’s past inability to arrive at an internal consensus about the
extent, scope, and binding effect of its provisional measures orders authority under
Article 41 of its Statute.
LaGrand, however, resolved the most fundamental of these issues, changing the
legal landscape in which the Court considered Mexico’s request. There, the Court
held that ‘the power to indicate provisional measures entails that such measures
should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on necessity, when
the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of
the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court’.81 Observing that its
order ‘wasnotmere exhortation’, theCourt then reviewed themeasures takenby the
United States and ruled that it didnot take ‘allmeasures at its disposal’ to prevent the
execution of the German nationalWalter LaGrand pending the Court’s decision on
themerits.82 The Court qualified its judgement in LaGrand, however, with language
that presaged Mexico’s request. It noted the United States’ representation that its
ability to comply had been constrained by ‘the character of the United States as a
federal republic of divided powers’, a system in which, the United States asserted,
only the Governor of Arizona had the power to stay an execution imposed under
Arizona law.83 TheCourt evidentlydeferred to this representation, emphasizing that
it had ‘not require[d] the United States to exercise powers it did not have’.84
For that reason, in AvenaMexico emphasized the simple but critical distinction
between physical and legal obstacles to compliance. There could be no question of
the physical ability of the United States to comply. In Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Court had ordered
Yugoslavia to ‘take all measureswithin its power to prevent commission of the crime
of genocide’, implicitly acknowledging (accurately or not) that Yugoslaviamayhave
lacked effective control over the various military and paramilitary forces engaged
in acts of genocide on its territory or under its technical legal control.85 But the
request inAvena, as in LaGrand andVienna Convention on Consular Relations, required
no onerous state action. Nor did it impose any financial burdens. It simply required
authoritiesof theUnitedStates to refrain fromcertainactions–simply, if graphically,
79. E.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] ICJ Rep. 3, 11, para. 32 (11 Sept.); Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] ICJ Rep. 89, 97 (5 July) (dissenting opinion of JudgesWiniarski and Badawi
Pasha).
80. E.g.,Cameroon v. Nigeria, supranote 71, (15March);Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States), [1984] ICJ Rep. 169, 187 (10May);Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), supra note 42,
(22 June); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), supra note 79, (5 July); Passage through the Great Belt
(Finland v. Denmark), supra note 42, (29 July).
81. LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 102; see also ibid., para. 109 (text, object and purpose, and travaux
préparatoires of the Statute of the Court support conclusion ‘that orders on provisional measures under
Art. 41 have binding effect’); see generally Oxman and Aceves, supra note 36.
82. LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, paras. 110, 115; see also ibid., paras. 111–14 (appraisingmeasures taken by
the United States).
83. Ibid., para. 95.
84. Ibid., para. 115.
85. Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia &Montenegro, supra note 42, 24, para. 52(a)(1) (8 April) (emphasis added).
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to forbear fromflipping the switches on electric chairs or injecting lethal substances
into persons – for the time necessary for the Court to consider and decide Mexico’s
application on the merits. The physical capacity of the United States to obey that
order couldnot be doubted. Its legal capacity, by contrast, the sole capacity that could
be doubted, remained irrelevant as a matter of international law.
By its agreement with that proposition in the Avena provisional measures order,
the ICJ reaffirmed a vital and indispensable principle governing the relationship
between international andmunicipal law,while at the sametimemanifestinganew-
found confidence in its provisionalmeasures authority in thewake of LaGrand. The
Court’s accession toMexico’s request that it replace ‘at its disposal’ with ‘necessary’,
finally,may suggest some frustrationwith theUnited States’ disregard of theCourt’s
two prior provisional measures orders in the Vienna Convention trilogy. In both,
it will be recalled, the United States pleaded deficiencies in its municipal law and
federal structure as justification for the failure of the competent authorities of its
political subdivisions to comply with the Court’s orders.
3.4. The implications for the ICJ’s authority and institutional integrity
Avena is the first provisional measures order issued by the ICJ after its historic
decision in LaGrand holding that provisional measures orders establish binding
obligations. How the United States responded to it may therefore have affected the
Court’sperceived institutional integrityandauthority inawaythat responsesbefore
LaGrand did not. As it happened, no conflict between the Court’s provisional meas-
ures order and the insistence of one of the states on carrying out an execution arose
during the period of the order’s effect. But it is worth asking, as a matter of inter-
national law, what legal consequences defiance of the ICJ’s provisional measures
order could have produced. First, in view of the International Law Commission’s
Articles on theResponsibility of States for InternationallyWrongfulActs,86 it is con-
ceivable that theCourt couldhaveheld theUnitedStates internationally responsible
for the execution of one or more Mexican nationals carried out in disregard of its
order even had it later determined, on themerits, thatMexico had no absolute right
to the vacatur of their sentences, as indeed was the case.87 Article 48(2) suggests
thatMexico could invoke theUnited States’ international legal responsibility in this
regard, not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of ‘the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached’, which could include, for example, the family of the deceased
Mexican national. At the same time, Article 48(2) ‘does not make clear whom the
[beneficiaries of the obligation breached] include and the commentary does not
elaborate on this point’, making it difficult to predict how this provision, which
one commentator has said ‘expands the domain within which state responsibility
86. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongful Acts, supra note 8, (‘commending’ the
Articles ‘to the attention of Governments’).
87. Cf. Oxman and Aceves, supra note 36, at 217 (observing that, after LaGrand, ‘the Court could conceivably
grant a provisionalmeasures order in a case where it subsequently determines that it lacks jurisdiction’, and
‘If violated, aprovisionalmeasuresorder could impose liabilityona state even if theCourt lacked jurisdiction
in the underlying dispute’); accord J. Fitzpatrick, ‘TheUnreality of International Law in theUnited States and
the LaGrand Case’, (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 427, 431.
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operates and in this sense represents progressive international legal development’,
may be applied in the future.88
Second, some observers feared that, after LaGrand, another failure or refusal by
the United States to comply with an ICJ provisional measures order, whether be-
cause of an alleged inability or unwillingness to control the acts of its constituent
political subdivisions, portended a threat to the ICJ’s institutional authority. While
this scenario never materialized, the fear appears, in any event, to have been over-
stated, if not unfounded. The United States undoubtedly possessed the ability to
comply with the Court’s order.89 The sole question raised by the Avena provisional
measures order, as by the orders in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, was of political will. The United States, like most states, abides by most of its
international obligations most of the time.90 Most international obligations, how-
ever, do not bear as heavily on the internal politics of a state as do those that impli-
cate capital punishment in the United States, which remains a highly controversial
political issue. The effect of the Avena provisional measures order on the right of
the United States’ constituent states to carry out the death penalty therefore may
have raised the internal political costs of compliance to the federal government.
Unlike most provisional measures orders, Avenamandated action (or forbearance)
that affected the internal politics and mores of a state in an area that provokes
strong emotional responses from the citizens who comprise the body politic in a
democracy. This helps to explain, which is not to say to justify, the dismal record of
compliance by the United States in the two prior Vienna Convention actions before
the ICJ.
Finally, some expressed the related fear that the Avena provisional measures
order and its predecessors threatened the institutional integrity of the Court. In this
regard the United States has repeatedly raised the spectre that the ICJ would be
forced to act as an international court of criminal appeal – that foreign nationals
would flock to the Court with Vienna Convention claims in an effort to void valid
criminal sentences imposed undermunicipal laws, sinking the Court in a quagmire
threatening its role in the peaceful, consensual resolution of inter-state disputes.91
88. E. BrownWeiss, ‘Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century’, (2002) 96 AJIL 798, 805–05; see
also D. D. Caron, ‘The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and
Authority’, (2002) 96 AJIL 857 (cautioning that the Articles provide a deceptive clarity that may not, in fact,
reflect the state of international law and should in any event not be accepted at face value).
89. See generally L. Henkin, ‘Provisional Measures, US Treaty Obligations, and the States’, (1998) 92 AJIL 679
(canvassing a variety of means by which the federal government could have ensured compliance with the
Court’s order inVienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2); see also C. M. Vazquez, ‘Breard and the
Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures’, (1998) 92 AJIL 683.
90. See L. Henkin,HowNations Behave (1979), 47; see also H. H. Koh, ‘WhyDoNations Obey International Law?’,
(1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599, 2599 (observing that ‘empirical work since [the date of Henkin’s assertion]
seems largely to have confirmed this hedged but optimistic description’).
91. See, e.g., Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America, 27 March 2000, para. 51, in LaG-
rand (contesting the admissibility of Germany’s second, third, and fourth submissions on the ground that
‘Germany seeks through those claims to have the Court play the role of ultimate court of appeal in na-
tional criminal proceedings’, a function that ‘would improperly transform and expand the Court’s role,
making it the overseer of national judicial systems in criminal cases’); see also Oral Submissions of the
United States of America, 7 April 1998, in Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2, para. 47
(cautioning that ‘Once the Court opens itself to this process, it can be expected that a greatmany defendants
will press the States of their nationality to take recourse to it’, including ‘not only those who received no
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But despite the three cases involving Vienna Convention violations to date, the risk
that a spate of similar applications will flood the Court appears overstated. The
political costs of suing the United States remain high, for most states prohibitively
so,92 and diplomacy remains the paramount tool for resolving treaty disputes.
4. DOMESTIC APPRAISAL: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES
As it happened, neither Texas nor Oklahoma, the two states directly affected by the
Court’s provisionalmeasures order inAvena, took steps to carry out an execution of
one of the Mexican nationals protected by the order. We can therefore do no more
than speculate about what the federal government’s response would have been.
At the time, it said little. The US State Department was reportedly ‘studying the
order’.93 This muted response suggests that the United States had hoped, above all,
to prevent the Avena order and its potential fallout from becoming headline news,
particularly at a time when both the perceived unilateralism and international
exceptionalism of the United States, on the one hand, and increasing scrutiny of the
death penalty process within the United States, on the other, remain controversial
issues. The state of Texas, by contrast, was less reticent. A spokesman for Governor
Richard Perry remarked, ‘According to our reading of the law and the treaty, there is
no authority for the federal government or theWorld Court to prohibit Texas from
exercising the laws passed by our Legislature.’94
The federal government’s past responses to provisional measures orders in the
Vienna Convention trilogy had not been encouraging. In Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations, its response can euphemistically be characterized as schizophrenic.
On the one hand, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright urged the Governor of
Virginia to stay the execution ‘[i]n light of the [ICJ’s] request, the unique and dif-
ficult foreign policy issues, and other problems created by the Court’s provisional
measures’, including that a refusal to comply could cause ‘negative consequences
for the many US citizens who live and travel abroad’ and ‘lead some countries to
contend incorrectly that the US does not take seriously its obligations under the
consular notification at all, but also thosewhomaywish to claim that thenotification receivedwas deficient,
incomplete, or tardy’).
92. As counsel for Paraguay emphasized in Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ‘This Court, I believe, will
appreciate the magnitude of a decision by a Government like that of Paraguay to institute proceedings in
the International Court of Justice against the United States’. Oral Submissions of Paraguay, April 7, 1998, in
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 2 (9 April).
93. C. Hines, ‘Opinion, Consular Rights, StationHouseWrongs’,HoustonChronicle, 23 Feb. 2003, available at 2003
WL 3239472.
94. Ibid. The United States, like all states, has the ‘power – I do not say the right – to violate international law
and obligation and to suffer the consequences’. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution (1996), 235
(emphasis in original). But Texas’s position that the federal government does not have the authority to
stay an execution authorized by its laws is indefensible. Federal laws based on treaty or other international
obligations prevail over state laws to the contrary. SeeUnited States v. Pink, supra note 39, 230–4;United States
v. Belmont, supra note 39, at 327, 331–2;Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 US 332 (1924), 341;Hauenstein v. Lynham,
100 US (10 Otto) 483, 488–9 (1879); Ware v. Hylton, 3 US (3 Dall.) 199, 236–7 (1796); cf. Missouri v. Holland,
252 US 416 (1920) (sustaining congressional power to legislate pre-emptively pursuant to a treaty in a legal
domain purportedly otherwise reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment).
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Convention’.95 That alone should have sufficed to compel the governor to stay the
execution – although the ambiguity of Secretary Albright’s letter on the issue of the
binding effect of ICJ orders arguably weakened its influence. But as Louis Henkin
wrote in the aftermath of Governor Gilmore’s decision to ignore the ICJ’s order
despite SecretaryAlbright’s request, ‘states are bound byUS foreign policy decisions
even if they do not take any formal form’; and under the Constitution treaty obliga-
tions of the United States bind state officials, such as Governor Gilmore, no less
than federal officials.96 Scholars have also noted that the federal government had an
ample variety of other means at its disposal to enforce the ICJ’s order.97
On the other hand, Solicitor General Seth P.Waxman submitted an amicus curiae
brief to the US Supreme Court urging it to deny certiorari and to refuse to stay
Breard’s execution. Waxman argued that provisional orders do not impose binding
obligations and that, in any event, Paraguay lacked a cognizable federal right of
action to seek to enforce those obligations.98 The Supreme Court, in turn, denied
certiorari in a brief per curiam order that elided a host of complex issues raised by
the related actions of Breard and Paraguay.99 That it refused to ‘delay the execution,
grant certiorari, and hear plenary briefing and argument’, as several scholars have
emphasized, seems incredible, ‘if only out of simple comity to the ICJ’.100
At the state level, Governor Gilmore of Virginia said that he believed his first
obligation as governor to be ‘to ensure that those who reside within [Virginia’s]
borders . . .may conduct their lives free of crime’.101 In addition, he explained, he
95. Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, US Secretary of State, to James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia
(13 April 1998).
96. US Const., Art. VI, cl. 2; see Henkin, supra note 89, at 681–2 (citing Ex parte Peru, 318 US 578, 589 (1943), and
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 US 30, 38 (1945)).
97. See ibid. (canvassingadditionalmeasuresbywhichthefederalgovernmentcouldhaveenforcedtheICJ’sorder,
includingby executiveorder or anaction in federal court by theAttorneyGeneral to compel compliance); see
alsoVazquez, supranote 89, at 685 (‘It is difficult tounderstandhowthe administration couldhave concluded
that the onlymeasure at the federal government’s disposal under such circumstances was to beseech a state
Governor to comply with the Order.); F. L. Kirgis, ‘Zscerhnig v. Miller and the Breard Matter’, (1998) 92 AJIL
704, 707 (arguing that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 US 429 (1968), which
held that an Oregon probate statute interfered with the federal government’s exclusive power over foreign
relations even in the absence of a formal indication to that effect by the executive branch, Virginia should
have stayed Breard’s execution inasmuch as ‘Zschernig applies a fortiori, since the state official . . . in this
matter not only denigrated the role of the International Court of Justice – a court whose Statute is a treaty
binding upon theUnited States – but also ignored or subordinated foreign policy concerns expressly pointed
out to him by the Secretary of State’).
98. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Breard v. Greene, supra note 36, at 49, at ∗49–∗50 (arguing that
‘The better reasoned position is that an [ICJ provisional measures order] is not binding); ibid., at17, at ∗17
(arguing that the Vienna Convention only ‘set[s] forth substantive rules of conduct’ and does ‘not create
private rights of action’ enforceable in United States courts) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 US 428 442 (1989)).
99. Breard v. Greene, supra note 36; see also ibid. at 379 (Stevens, J, dissenting) (observing the absence of any ‘com-
pelling reason’ not to stay the execution and hear plenary briefing, particularly in view of ‘the international
aspects of this case’); ibid. at 380 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (declining to accept, ‘without examining the record
more fully’, that Breard and Paraguay’s ‘arguments are obviously without merit’ or ‘to accept without fuller
briefing and consideration the positions taken by the majority’) (emphasis in original).
100. H. H. Koh, ‘Paying “Decent Respect” toWorld Opinion on the Death Penalty’, (2002) 35UCDavis Law Review
1085, 1113; see also A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Court to Court’, (1998) 92 AJIL 708, at 708 (arguing that elementary
principles of comity well established under federal law should have led the Supreme Court to ‘honor . . . the
ICJ’s request’, binding or not, ‘as a matter of judicial comity’).
101. Commonwealth of Virginia, Officer of the Governor, Press Office, Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore
Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (14 April 1998), at 2.
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preferred to carry out Breard’s execution on schedule because, should the ICJ rule
in Paraguay’s favour, it would be more difficult for him to carry out the execution
at that point.102 Of course, in one sense, ‘It is neither surprising nor particularly
objectionable that the Governor of a state believes he owes his primary duty to
its citizens.’103 At the same time, it is ironic, if not reprehensible, that the federal
government did not intervene on behalf of the United States to vindicate national
interests in the face of a parochial state decision. The threat of foreign hostilities
inherent in a disunited central government incapable of compelling state adher-
ence to international obligations permeates The Federalist Papers.104 For this reason,
among others, it became ‘one of the main objects of the constitution to make
[the United States], so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one
nation’.105
The United States’ response to the LaGrand order, while perhaps more under-
standable in view of the time constraints under which it operated, nonetheless
seems equally deplorable. As the Court noted in its final judgement, even assuming
the truth of the United States’ protestations of its limited capacity to enforce the
order in the face of recalcitrant state conduct, the federal government did not take
‘all measures at its disposal’ to stay Walter LaGrand’s execution.106 Again, the So-
licitor General expressed the view that the Vienna Convention does not ‘furnish a
basis . . . to grant a stay of execution’ and that ‘an order of the International Court of
Justice indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis
for judicial relief’.107 And again, the Supreme Court denied Germany’s motion for
leave to file an original bill of complaint and refused to stay the execution, giving
short shrift to the arguments advanced by Germany.108 Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice Stevens, observed in dissent, first, that comity counselled a stay because ‘both
the ICJ and a sovereign nation have asked that we stay this case’; and, second, that
a stay ‘would give us time to consider, after briefing from all interested parties, the
jurisdiction and international legal issues involved’,109 noting that the majority’s
102. Ibid.
103. Vazquez, supra note 89, at 684.
104. John Jay wrote that the Constitution would ‘secure [the Union] against the hostilities and improper inter-
ference of foreign nations’ by vesting authority over foreign affairs exclusively in the federal government.
‘The Federalist No. 5’ (John Jay), in The Federalist, ed. J. E. Cooke (1961), 27; see also ibid., ‘The Federalist
No. 3’ (John Jay), 14–15 (‘It is of high importance to the peace of America, that she observe the laws of nations
towards all these Powers [foreign nations], and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and
punctually done by one national Government, than it could be either by thirteen separate States, or by three
or four distinct confederacies’); ibid., ‘The Federalist No. 4’ (John Jay) (cautioning against the inducements
to war threatening the nascent Republic and emphasizing that a unified government can better prevent
and confront the threat of war); ibid., ‘The Federalist No. 80’ (Alexander Hamilton), at 536 (‘The union will
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an
injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it’).
105. Holmes v. Jennison, 39US (14 Pet.) 540 (1840), 575 (Taney, CJ); accordChaeChan Ping v. United States, 130US 581
(1889), 606 (‘[F]or national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people,
one nation, one power’); see also ‘The Federalist No. 42’ (James Madison), in The Federalist, supra note 104,
at 279 (‘If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations’).
106. See LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, paras. 111–15.
107. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, supra note 36, 113.
108. See ibid.
109. Ibid. at 113 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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terse dismissal of the potentially complex issues raised ‘suggest[ed] a need for fuller
briefing’.110
In view of this record, what could have been expected had a state elected to
proceedwith the execution of aMexicannational protected by theAvena order? The
United States plainly hoped to avoid that scenario, and it did. But had it arisen, the
principle differencewouldhave been the change in the order’s phraseology. Because
of the substitutionof ‘necessary’ for ‘at its disposal’, no longer could theUnitedStates
plausiblymaintain, as it did in LaGrand andVienna Convention on Consular Relations,
that by urging a state governor to stay the execution, it had taken all the measures
‘at its disposal’. Nor could it have argued that its federal structure and municipal
laws disabled it from ensuring compliance with the Court’s order. In short, had the
United States elected to disregard theCourt’s provisionalmeasures order inAvena, it
would not have been able to invoke the fiction of federalism constraints as a veneer
for its political decision not to comply.
Informally, however, theUnitedStatesmayhave takensteps toavoidbeingplaced
in that awkwardsituation. InMay2003,WilliamHowardTaft IV,LegalAdviser to the
US Department of State, addressed the National Association of Attorneys General
to emphasize the extent to which ‘legal work at every level of government is being
influenced by international law and activities’ generally, and in particular by the
contentious issue of the death penalty.111 In his address, he emphasized the need
to ensure compliance with the Vienna Convention as the law of the land and to
inform state and local officers of their international obligations in this regard. He
also explainedAvena and its predecessor actions. Perhaps tellingly, he remarked that
‘those of youwho are Attorneys General of [those states inwhichMexican nationals
enumerated in Mexico’s application remain on death row] should have received a
letter fromme advising you of this case, and of the fact that we will need your help
in defending the United States’.112 The State Department may therefore have taken
steps to avert the situation it faced in LaGrand and Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.
The federal judiciary never directly faced a conflict with the Avena order. But in
Torres v. Mullin, the Supreme Court, while not confronted with Torres’s imminent
execution in violation of the Avena provisional measures order, denied his petition
for awrit of certiorari, againover the strongdissent of Justice Breyer.113 Justice Breyer,
after reviewing the legal argumentsmade by Torres andMexico, observed incisively
that ‘The answer to Lord Ellenborough’s famous rhetorical question, “Can the Island
of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?” may well be yes, where
theworldhas conferred suchbinding authority through treaty.’114 InLoza v.Mitchell,
theUnited States District Court for the SouthernDistrict of Ohio, while denying the
110. Ibid. at 114 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
111. RemarksoftheHonorableWilliamHowardTaft, IV,LegalAdvisor,USDepartmentofState,beforetheNational
Association of Attorneys General, 20 March 2003, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/resional/nea/iraq/text
2003/032120taft.htm (last visited 5 April 2003).
112. Ibid.
113. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562 (2003).
114. Ibid., at 565 (Breyer, J, dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Rep.
546 (KB 1808)).
692 ROBERT D. SLOANE
habeas petitioner’s motion for suspension of the briefing schedule, said: ‘Without
expressinganyopinionon themerits of theUnitedMexicanStates’ complaint, or the
potential impact of a favorable ruling on petitioner’s case, this Court recognizes the
benefits of maintaining the status quo in these habeas corpus proceedings pending
resolution of the International Court of Justice proceedings.’115 At least one other
federal district court has paid serious attention to LaGrand,116 andmoremay follow
suit in the aftermath of theAvena judgement.117
Inthefinalanalysis,compliancewiththeAvenaprovisionalmeasuresorderwould
likelyhavedependedonthe federalgovernment’spolitical assessmentof the relative
consequences of its action vis-à-vis the states and its domestic political constituency,
on the one hand, and the states and the international community, on the other. The
former tend to support capital punishment, at least in those states affected byAvena.
The latter oppose capital punishment categorically andwith increasing vehemence.
AsHaroldKoh, formerAssistantSecretaryofState forDemocracy,HumanRights,and
Labor, recently emphasized, ‘Simply put: no other civilized, democratic government
that has a commitment to human rights resorts to the death penalty in the way we
do.’118 Those stateswould likely have perceived a decisionnot to complywithAvena
as another example of the United States’ disregard for international law generally
and of the Bush administration’s strident unilateralism. At a time when the United
States requires the international co-operation of states to combat terrorism and
rebuild and establish stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, to have flouted the Avena
order overtlywould have imposed serious political costs on the federal government.
Unqualified cynicism should be avoided, however. TheAvena order, and now the
ICJ’s decision on the merits, may well produce positive long-term effects along two
dimensions. Itmaycontribute to thegrowingnormative trend in international juris-
prudence towards abolitionof the deathpenalty or, at aminimum, the imperative to
employ themost exacting standards of due process in states that continue to impose
capital punishment. Andwithin theUnited States, the desire to avoid similar future
conflicts with states like Mexico may raise the level of compliance with the Vienna
Convention, whatever the United States’ future response to its international legal
115. Loza v. Mitchell, No. C–1–98–287 (SD Ohio 31 Jan. 2003).
116. United States ex rel Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968 (ND Ill. 2002), 977–80; see also S. D. Murphy,
‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: United States Compliance with
LaGrand’, (2003) 37 AJIL 180.
117. On 13May 2004, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in response to theAvena final judgement, issued
a remarkable order staying the execution of Torres and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine, inter alia, ‘whether Torreswas prejudiced by the State’s violation of his Vienna Convention rights
in failing to inform Torres, after he was detained, that he had the right to contact the Mexican consulate’.
Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04–442, Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary
Hearing, 13 May 2004. The same day, however, Oklahoma’s Governor, Brad Henry, mooted the issue by
commuting Torres’s sentence to life imprisonment. See A. Liptak, ‘Execution ofMexican IsHalted’,NewYork
Times, 14 May 2004, at A23. It remains too early to tell whether other US courts will follow suit. In the only
other published decision to consider the issue at the time of this writing, the US Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit refused to give Avena binding effect, reasoning that while ‘Avena and LaGrand were decided
after Breard, and contradict Breard, we may not disregard the Supreme Court’s clear holding that ordinary
procedural default rules can bar Vienna Convention claims’. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir.
2004).
118. Koh, supra note 100, at 1104 (emphasis removed).
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obligations under the Statute of the ICJ, the Convention, and judgements rendered
pursuant to the Court’s jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol.
Taft’s public address to the National Association of Attorneys General, for ex-
ample, is unusual. After Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the State Depart-
ment, as it emphasized to the Court in LaGrand,119 initiated a programme to dis-
seminate broadly a manual on consular notification and to distribute pocket cards
for use by law enforcement agents.120 It seems less likely that the State Department
would have taken such steps to increase the level of knowledge and compliance
with the Vienna Convention were it not for the trilogy of cases culminating in
Avena. In 1999, moreover, California enacted a law mandating that state and local
police inform foreign nationals of their consular rights under Article 36 within two
hoursof their arrest ordetention.121 Finally, somecourtshavebegun toacknowledge
LaGrand and give it persuasive, if not binding, effect.122 These developments suggest
that Avena, too, whatever its reception at the formal political level, may produce
positive long-term effects normatively and at the practical level of implementation
of Vienna Convention obligations within the United States.
5. CONCLUSION
To conclude, it is worth asking a related question about the relation of Avena and
the prior Vienna Convention actions to the maintenance of capital punishment by
the United States: is Judge Oda right? At bottom, isAvena really about ‘abhorrence –
by Mexico and others – of the death penalty’? A principal reason why the United
States retains the death penalty despite the trend towards its worldwide abolition is
that ithas relegated thedecision to local democraticpolitics.Whereaspolitical elites
abolished the deathpenalty inmost states inwesternEurope and elsewhere – and its
abolitionhasbeen requiredas a conditionofmembershipof theEuropeanUnion, for
example – political constituencies in many states of the United States have elected
to retain the death penalty when it has been put to popular vote. Until abolition
becomes customary international law or the Supreme Court declares capital pun-
ishment unconstitutional, that arguably remains a decision, as the United States
repeatedly asserts, for its body politic rather than the international community.
Butwhile theUnitedStatesperhapspresentlycan, asamatterof international law,
preserve the institution of capital punishment, it cannot avoid the consequences –
including, increasingly, the international consequences – of that decision. Because
most states find it abhorrent, as JudgeOdawrote,Mexico’s insistence that its nation-
als facing capital punishment receive themaximum level of due-process protection
towhich international lawentitles them isunderstandable. Even if theUnitedStates
119. See LaGrand Judgement, supra note 9, para. 121.
120. See Amnesty International, A Time For Action – Protecting the Consular Rights of Foreign Nationals Facing the
Death Penalty (2001), 6–7.
121. Ibid., at 7.
122. See, e.g.,United States ex rel Madej v. Schomig, supra note 116, at 977–80; see also S. D. Murphy, ‘Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: United States Compliance with LaGrand ’, (2003)
37 AJIL 180.
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can continue to resort to the death penalty, it must now factor into its assessment
of that punishment’s value the escalating political, diplomatic, and financial costs
it will incur in the course of litigating compliance with the Vienna Convention
(and perhaps other international instruments) before the ICJ and other inter-
national bodies,123 just as it must in defending capital punishment in diplomatic
and international human rights fora.124
Avena, in the final analysis, therefore manifests the tension both (i) between
international and domestic punitive norms; and (ii) between, on the one hand, the
demands of international law in an increasingly globalized world that facilitates
the cross-fertilization of legal and moral norms and, on the other, those of internal
politics in apopular democracy. The ICJ,Avena and its predecessors suggest, canplay
a non-trivial role in resolving those tensions.
123. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, has held that because a violation of the rights
protected by Art. 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention would be ‘prejudicial to the guarantees of the due
process of law, . . . in such circumstances, imposition of the death penalty is a violation of the right not to be
‘arbitrarily’ deprived of one’s life . . .with the juridical consequences inherent in a violation of this nature,
i.e., those pertaining to the international responsibility of the State and the duty to make reparations’. The
Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of
Law, Advisory Opinion OC–16/99 (ser. A) No. 16, paras. 134–37 (Oct. 1). Of course, the Inter-American Court
interpreted consular rights within a distinct treaty-based framework, the very object of which is to codify
human rights standards. AmericanConvention onHumanRights, 22Nov. 1969, 1114UNTS123. But a strong
argument can be advanced that some robust conception of due process in criminal cases, particularly those
that implicate the death penalty, has become customary international law. If that is correct, then just as the
Court canand should interpret theViennaConventionwithin the context of general principles of customary
international law on state responsibility and remedies, equally it can and should consider the Convention
within the context of the customary international law of human rights.
124. See Koh, supra note 100, at 1104–6 (documenting widespread condemnation of the United States’ resort to
the death penalty and the severe diplomatic and political costs it imposes in the arena of foreign relations).
